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Abstract 
Purpose: This study examines the influence of corporate social disclosure on firm performance within the 
context of Bangladesh. 
Design/methodology/approach: This study develops hypotheses with the light of legitimacy and 
signalling theory using top 200 firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh. Corporate social 
disclosure (CSD) data are based on the period from 2011 to 2013, and the firm performance (FP) is based 
on the respective following year 2012 to 2014. A corporate social disclosure index (CSDI) including three 
categories (long-term, short- term and general disclosure) is constructed to measure the extent of social 
disclosures in annual reports. Firm performance is measured based on three indicators including Return 
on Asset (ROA), Market Capitalization, and Tobin Q. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Two Stage Least 
Square (2SLS) are used in analysing the data. 
Findings: It is found that there is a significant relationship between corporate social disclosure and the 
following year's firm performance for every performance indicator. It is also found that long-term 
disclosure plays a key role in influencing the firm performance. 
Originality/ value: CSD is country-specific and, hence, the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm 
performance can vary from country to country. This study enhances understating of such relationship as 
it considers within the context of a developing country. The finding of this study is robust as every 
indicator of firm performance is found to be related positively to firm performance. 
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The Effects of Corporate Social Disclosure on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a growing interest in regards to corporate social disclosure of firm’s activities to 
be disclosed in its annual report within the developed as well as the developing countries. It is 
argued that from a firm’s perspective, any corporate disclosure may be incorporated in an annual 
report in two different forms: mandatory or voluntary. In general, most of the firm’s activities of 
the financial nature are regulated by the enforced corporate acts or relevant accounting standards 
adopted by the respective country in which the firm is in operation. However, in respect to 
disclosure that is not regulated by law is called voluntary disclosure. Corporate social disclosure 
(CSD) is mostly considered voluntary disclosure that emphasises the consideration of moral 
obligation and accountability towards the society. Since corporate social disclosure has an 
influence on firm performance, therefore, academics, policymakers, governing bodies and 
investors, to name a few, from both the developed and developing countries perspective have 
become increasingly interested to enhance  understanding of the relationship between corporate 
social disclosure and firm performance. However, the relationship from prior studies found to be 
inconclusive (Griffin and Mahon, 1997, Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
As the literature is yet considered to be inconclusive and there are some factors which 
have been considered as constraints for such conclusiveness; and, therefore, there is a necessity 
to address those further.  First, there is a view that statistical analyses to examine the relationship 
between disclosure and firm performance are not without limitations (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, 
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Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). Second, as to the relationship between CSD and firm performance the 
selection of appropriate indicators of firm performance is challenging (Griffin and Mahon, 1997, 
Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003). Third, categories of firm performance measurements (i.e., 
accounting based, market- based and mixed) are also subject to limitations (Richard et al., 2009).  
There is a view that corporate social issues in developed countries are monitored by 
strong regulated monitoring bodies as well as the interested parties in the society. In contrast, in 
developing countries such issues might not be monitored effectively for many reasons including 
poverty, corruption, social inequalities and mismanagement, small capital market, and weak 
regulations. As such, CSD is mainly considered to be an occidental concept of western countries 
due to strong corporate regulations and standards compare to developing countries (Chapple and 
Moon, 2005). Some of the extant CSD studies from developing country context were also seen to 
be consistent with such perceptions with exceptions (Belal, 1999, Belal, 2001, Chapple and 
Moon, 2005, Ratanajongkol et al., 2006, Sobhani et al., 2009).  Such findings lead to further 
examine as to whether firms from developing country contexts use CSD as effective mediums of 
communication with various stakeholders which ultimately effects firm performance (Aras et al., 
2010). That is, to reiterate, it is apparent that the effects of CSD on firm performance within 
developing countries are not documented in an extensive manner compare to those carried out 
using developed country contexts.  
Since CSD varies in annual reports from country to country (Boesso and Kumar, 2007, 
Burton et al., 2000) as there are no unified voluntary disclosure practices to be applied; therefore,  
the same occidental concept of CSD may not be applicable for developing country concept due 
to different cultural models and traditional customs (Burton et al., 2000, Disu and Gray, 1998, 
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Edmondson and Carroll, 1999).  Thus far, the limited studies that exist using developing country 
contexts (Lu et al., 2014, Orlitzky et al., 2003) includes China, Malaysia, and Singapore (Ahmad 
et al., 2003, Eng and Mak, 2003, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007).   
The objective of this study is two folded. First, it is to investigate the effects of CSD on 
firm performance by addressing the constraints of prior studies. Second, this study is to examine 
the effects of CSD on firm performance within the context of a developing country.  
Bangladeshi context is considered for this study. Such a consideration is motivated for the 
following reasons. First, there exist a limited number of studies that have examined the effects of 
CSD to firm performance (FP) in Bangladesh.  In addition, CSD research in Bangladesh are 
mainly limited to explore the extent of corporate social issues in annual reports (Azim et al., 
2009, Belal, 1999, Belal, 2001, Belal, 2008, Belal and Momin, 2009, Kamal and Deegan, 2013, 
Sobhani et al., 2009) and determinants of CSD (Khan et al., 2013, Muttakin and Khan, 2014, 
Rashid and Lodh, 2008); rather than examining the relationship between CSD and FP. As such, 
the effects of CSD on firm performance are not well documented yet in Bangladeshi context.   
Second, Bangladesh economy is progressing with an inspiring track record with the growth of 
nearly six percent per year sustained over the past decade. A recent report from World Bank
1
 and 
PWC
2
 also forecasts that Bangladesh will be one of the emerging economies within a few 
decades. Accordingly, Bangladesh government is also keen to improve social condition at both 
                                                 
1
 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2016/04/30/bangladesh-development-update-bangladesh-
economy-requires-focus-on-sustainable-and-inclusive-growth-moving-forward 
2
 http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/the-economy/assets/world-in-2050-february-2015.pdf 
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micro and macro level
3
. As a result, it is reasonable to believe that firms from Bangladesh may 
consider social disclosure to legitimise firm activities as a part of social and global concerns. 
Security Exchange Commission (SEC) of Bangladesh was also reformed in 2011 to ensure more 
transparency and disclosure from the listed firms.  Moreover, a firm within developing countries 
like Bangladesh highly relies on foreign aid and investments.   
 Thus, the remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section documents 
CSD and FP with the lens of legitimacy and signalling theories. A review of the literature on the 
effects CSD on FP is addressed afterward. This is followed by an elaboration on the linkage 
between CSD and FP within Bangladeshi context. This is followed by the development of 
hypotheses for this study. Next, the details of the research method used in the study are 
addressed. The results of this study are then shown in the following part. In the final section, the 
implications, limitations and the further scope are elaborated. 
 
2 Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
2.1 Theoretical Frameworks 
There exist several theoretical stances that have been adopted by prior studies in 
examining the relationship between corporate social disclosures and firm performance within 
developed as well as developing country contexts. Among the theories, legitimacy theory is one 
of the widely considered theory within voluntary disclosure context. The legitimacy theory is 
based on the view of a social contract that exists between the firm and society. Suchman (1995) 
                                                 
3
 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/13/bangladesh-development-update-slower-yet-healthy-growth-with-
remarkable-development-progress  
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outlines legitimacy concept as ‘‘generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions’’ (p 574). In addition, according to  Guthrie and Parker (1989) & 
O’Donovan (2002),  legitimacy theory is based on the concept that a firm should operate by 
satisfying the expectation of the society. Furthermore, legitimacy theory explains how firms may 
intend to legitimise their operational activities by engaging additional information through 
voluntary disclosure (An et al., 2011, Deegan et al., 1996, Deegan and Gordon, 1996). For 
legitimising firm’s operational activities, firm provide additional information through voluntary 
disclosure like social disclosure. A firm also considers such disclosure to substantiate firm’s 
accountability towards the society as an element of a social contract as well as to receive a 
positive impression from various interested parties within the society. As a result, using 
voluntary disclosure perspective, a wide number of studies have explored such relationships 
using legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2002, Guthrie et al., 2006, Khan et al., 2013, Khan, 2010, 
Muttakin and Khan, 2014, O’Donovan, 2002).  
There is a view that some significant features of legitimacy theory can explain corporate 
social disclosure aspects more effectively. First, according to legitimacy theory, legitimising firm 
activities means establishing that firm activities (operational) comply with the social values of 
the society in which it operates, and also those activities must be acknowledged through firm’s 
disclosure (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). As a result, a firm may motivate to focus on voluntary 
disclosures (Deegan, 2002). Therefore, it is argued that firm’s legitimising efforts and voluntary 
disclosure may have a close interaction. Second, from corporate social disclosure perspective, 
legitimising firm’s activities are much significant for firm’s image and value through which 
firms try to communicate with the interested parties  (Deegan, 2002, Deegan et al., 2002, Guthrie 
Page 6 of 36 
 
et al., 2006, O’Donovan, 2002). Finally, through corporate social disclosure a firm may want to 
convey firm’s strategic value and the potential value-creating capacities. Moreover, legitimacy 
theory can be used to explore the current status of voluntary disclosure as well.    
Signalling theory, on the other hand, posits the concept of disclosure from a different 
viewpoint. It views disclosure in annual reports can provide a signal and, therefore, facilitates 
effective commutation with the interested parties. Signalling theory originally constructed by 
(Spence, 1973) to explain the behaviour of labour market.  (Morris, 1987) advocates, the concept 
of signalling theory is more applicable in accounting studies to explore information asymmetry. 
An et al. (2011) note that firm may reduce information asymmetry by considering extra 
information (mostly positive information) as a signal. Thus, signalling may have an impact on 
interested parties’ perceptions towards the firm performance (Whiting and Miller, 2008). It is 
also argued that the concept of signalling is associated with voluntary disclosure (Watson et al., 
2002, Whiting and Miller, 2008, Xiao et al., 2004). According to signalling theory, firms can 
differentiate their activities by sending signals to the interested parties for developing a positive 
image. Whiting and Miller (2008) argue that consideration of such a signal a firm may help 
encouraging interested parties to reassess the value of the firm(Botosan, 1997, Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002, Dhaliwal et al., 2011, Sengupta, 1998). As such, firms may also create a positive 
image and reduce information asymmetry by considering  corporate social disclosure as a signal 
of  firm’s social commitment (Anderson and Frankle, 1980, Shane and Spicer, 1983). 
 Based on the above discussions, this study considers using legitimacy and 
signalling theories. The considered theoretical perspectives of this study are presented in Figure 
1.  
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Figure1: Theoritical perspective for this study. 
 
2.2 Literature on the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance  
There exits plethora of studies conducted on the effects of corporate social disclosure on 
firm performance using developed country context. Several meta-analyses show that a significant 
number of prior studies have reported mixed findings (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010, Mathews, 
1997, Orlitzky et al., 2003).  De Klerk et al. (2015) report that CSD has a positive effect on the 
share price of a firm. They have examined 89 largest firms in the UK for the year 2007-08. 
Within the research model, their study considers firm size and leverage as a control variable for 
the firm performance. They argue that having more CSD reduces the information asymmetry. As 
a result, the investors might assess the risk of the firm more efficiently and lead to a better firm 
performance (share price). Qiu et al. (2016) suggest a positive relationship regarding the effects 
of CSD on firm performance (market-based measure) after examining 152 firms from FTSE 350 
for the year 2005to 2009.  They argue that having CSD in annual reports can act as firm’s 
competitive advantage which can lead to a better firm performance.   
Legitimacy Theory 
legitimizing firm activities  as a 
social contract/ accountability 
Signalling theory 
Reducing information 
asymmetry by sending signal 
Interested Parties 
(Investors, policy 
makers and so on)  
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Within the context of developing/emerging countries, Choi et al. (2010) examine Korean 
firms by considering 1222 firm-years using data from 2002 to 2008. Their study has considered 
disclosure index using both weighted and un-weighted indices and several firm performance 
indicators including ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q.  Their findings show that the weighted CSD 
index effects FP, but un-weighted index of CSD is not. Platonova et al. (2016) found that CSD 
has an influence on firm performance. Their study considers 24 Islamic banks in Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC - 9 from Bahrain, 3 from Qatar, 3 from Kuwait, 4 from Saudi Arabia 
and 5 from UAE) over the period 2000 to 2014. They rely on accounting based measurements 
(ROA and ROE) and have found a positive relationship. They have further investigated on the 
relationship between CSD categories and firm performance as well, but they could not find any 
significant association among the considered categories.    
 
2.3 Literature on the relationship between CSD and firm performance within Bangladesh 
It is from late ‘90s, researches on corporate social issues have been considered by several 
researchers in Bangladesh. Belal (1999) is the pioneer of social reporting studies in Bangladeshi 
context. In Bangladesh, prior studies regarding CSD are mostly emphasised to assess the extent 
of disclosure rather than examining the relationship between the CSD and FP (Azim et al., 2009, 
Belal, 2008, Belal and Momin, 2009, Khan et al., 2009, Sobhani et al., 2009).  
 Although there is an increasing trend of corporate social disclosure by Bangladeshi 
firms, but, to reiterate, the effects of CSD on firm performance has not yet been well researched. 
For example, Hossain et al. (2015) report that CSD has a positive impact on firm performance for 
Bangladeshi firms. They have considered 131 listed firms in Bangladesh by excluding Treasury 
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Bond and Mutual Funds for the period of 2008 to 2012. In light of legitimacy theory, their study 
suggests that CSD influences positively on return on asset and return on equity, but fails to find 
such effects using Tobin Q.  
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development  
It is apparent in the prior studies from both developed and developing country contexts 
that there is mixed evidence (positive, negative and neutral) as to the effects of corporate social 
disclosure on firm performance. Therefore, consistent with the considered theories, the following 
hypotheses are developed to examine the effects of CSD on FP for Bangladeshi contexts: 
H1: Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Firm Performance.  
     H1(a): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Return on Asset 
     H1(b): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Market Capitalization 
     H1(c): Corporate Social Disclosure is positively associated with Tobin Q 
 
3 Empirical tests 
 3.1 Sample Selection  
For collecting corporate social disclosure data annual reports of the firms have been 
considered as a source. There are some significant reasons to consider annual reports as a source 
of data.  First, an annual report is considered as a source for most of the information of a firm 
(Botosan, 1997) because significant issues and concerns of a firm are expressed comprehensively 
through the annual report (Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005, Khan et al., 2009). Second, annual 
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report is  easily accessible source of  information (Unerman, 2000) that can be obtained in both 
hard copies  as well as electronically. Therefore, for exploring CSD from a reliable source, this 
study considers annual reports as source of data.. However, for gathering firm performance, 
Bloomberg Database has been considered instead that of relying on annual reports. It should be 
noted that some financial performance information such as market capitalization data of a firm is 
not available from the annual reports. Therefore, there is a necessity to collect all the market data 
from one authentic platform; this study thus relies on Bloomberg database.  
 Top 200 firms (based on market capitalization) listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
(DSE) are considered as the sample for this study. Having a higher marker capitalization is 
deemed to have extra resources compare to other firms (Adams et al., 1998, Andrew et al., 1989) 
and expected to be more proactive for social disclosure perspectives. Within the top 200 firms, 
there are some sectors including the Bond, Insurance, and Mutual Funds have extremely different 
reporting structure for firm performance data; therefore,  Bond, Insurance and Mutual Funds 
sectors are not considered for this study. After excluding these sectors, a final 134 firms (68% of 
total market equity and 45.0% of total sample) have been considered.  
It should be noted that Bangladesh share market confronted by a severe stock market 
collapse due to price bubble in 2010 (Barua et al., 2014) and gradually turn as normal in 2011. 
As a result, the consideration of data from 2011 may help to avoid the distortion from the share 
market collapse.  Therefore, in regards to corporate social disclosure data, this study considers 
from the year 2011 and onwards. In addition, the data of FP variables are collected from annual 
reports for the financial year 2012 to 2014 to apply one year lag. The lag concept is being 
implemented with the argument that the effects of CSD are observable in next available financial 
Page 11 of 36 
 
period and this approach is consistent with the prior studies (Harjoto and Jo, 2015, Mahoney and 
Thorne, 2005, Waddock and Graves, 1997). Therefore, this study collects data from 2011 to 
2013 for corporate social disclosure and 2012 to 2014 for firm performance data.  134 firms for 
three years resulted in a final sample of 402 firm-year observations.  Table 1 is presented below 
to show the sector wise sampling information.  
Table 1: Sector-wise sample details 
Sector Total 
Firms 
Firms within 
Top 200 
Firms included as 
sample 
Observed Firm 
Years 
Bank 30 30 30 90 
Cement 7 7 6 18 
Ceramic 5 3 3 9 
Engineering 26 18 12 36 
Food & Allied 17 9 8 24 
Fuel & Power 15 13 12 36 
IT 6 2 1 3 
Miscellaneous 9 6 4 12 
NBFI 23 22 19 57 
Pharmaceutical 24 19 16 48 
Service & Real Estate 3 3 3 9 
Tannery 5 3 3 9 
Telecommunication 2 2 2 6 
Textile 31 18 13 39 
Travel & Leisure 3 2 2 2 
Bond 3 2  0 0 
Insurance 46 31  0 0 
Mutual Fund 41 10  0 0 
Paper & Printing 1 0  0 0 
Jute 3 0  0 0 
Total 300 200* 134** 402 
    * Top 200 covers 77% of Total Market Equity &  67% of Total Sample Size  
    ** Selected sample covers 68% of Total Market Equity & 45% of Total Sample Size 
 
3.2 Corporate Social Disclosure Index- Independent Variable  
Corporate Social Disclosure Index is considered as a proxy on the extent of CSD. It is 
measured in terms of various social features reported in the firm’s annual report. Consistent with 
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earlier studies (Hackston and Milne, 1996, Haniffa and Cooke, 2005, Kamal and Deegan, 2013) 
a checklist of 30 items has been selected to assess the extent of CSD within the annual reports.  
Selected 30 items of corporate social disclosure are sub-categorised based on various 
social contexts. Categorising disclosure is an important factor.   (Meek et al., 1995).    30 items 
are categorised into a wide range of categories including governance, strategy, employee, 
customer, donation and generic concept of the social disclosure are captured (Hackston and 
Milne, 1996, Haniffa and Cooke, 2005, Kamal and Deegan, 2013). 
As well, corporate social activities are considered as a strategic tools as it  has the 
potential to develop competitive advantage of a firm (Mishra and Suar, 2010) as such the 
selected CSD items could be then viewed from strategic management context. As the strategic 
management  needs to be focused for both long-term and short-term (Hill et al., 2014); therefore,   
the selected CSD items could be re-categorised into sub-categories:  long-term, short-term and 
generic CSDs. That is, the selected 30 items have been categorised within three sub-categories as 
attached in Appendix A. These include 19 items for long term, 9 items for short-term and 2 items 
for general categories.   
Content analysis has been applied to measure corporate social disclosure as it is the most 
common method of measuring CSD (Yamagami and Kokubu, 1991). Content analysis is a 
method of capturing the text (or content) into code within several categories depending on 
selected criteria and widely used in the literature as a reliable method (Weber, 1985; Guthrie and 
Petty, 2000 Rashid 2015). Regarding the score calculation, every disclosure item has been given 
same significance or weight and this approach is consistent with prior studies (Esa and Anum 
Mohd Ghazali, 2012, Haji, 2013, Khan et al., 2013, Mohd Ghazali, 2007, Muttakin and Khan, 
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2014, Said et al., 2009). That is,  unweighted calculation has been applied in this study as well. In 
particular, a firm is awarded a value of 1 if an item included in the checklist is disclosed and a 
value of 0 otherwise. However, some disclosure items may not be applicable for every sector that 
may distort the score of the corporate social disclosure index. To resolve the potential problem, 
consistent with the prior studies, this study also considers maximum possible score to calculate 
CSD index (CSDI)  (Chau and Gray, 2002, Cooke, 1989, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Lim et al., 
2007, Owusu-Ansah, 1998).  For example, irrelevant items for any particular firm (sector) is 
considered as “Not Applicable” and CSDI is calculated by considering the proportion of 
disclosures made by the firm and maximum possible score for that firm instead that of 30 items. 
Such judgement is possible after reading the entire annual reports (Cooke, 1992, Khan et al., 
2013).Therefore, the measurement of voluntary disclosure is based on the following un-weighted 
index.  
j
n
i
ij
n
X
iCSDI

 1
 
Where,  
CSDIj = Corporate Social  Disclosure Index of j
th
 firm categories,  
Nj    = the maximum number of items which the firm is expected to disclosure.  
Xij    =1 if i
th
 item is disclosed, 0 if i
th
 item is not disclosed   
 
As to the constructed corporate social disclosure index, it is also essential to confirm the 
reliability. Internal consistency is a widely used technique for assessing the reliability of a 
measurement (Hassan and Marston, 2010, Hassan et al., 2009). Internal consistency means the 
degree to which the items in a test measure the same construct. Consistent with prior studies,   
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) has been applied to check reliability (Botosan, 
1997, Gul and Leung, 2004, Khan et al., 2013).   
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3.3 Firm Performance- Dependent Variable 
Measuring firm performance in an appropriate manner is significant as various contingent 
factors are related to the measurement processes (Orlitzky et al., 2003, Peloza, 2009, Richard et 
al., 2009, Wu, 2006). In the literature a large number of indicators have been considered to 
measure firm performance. These wide range of indicators are categorised  into three categories 
such as accounting based measure (i.e.., return on assets, return on sales), market based measure 
(i.e., market capitalization, earning per share) and Mix  measure (Tobin Q).   
Within three types of firm performance measurement approaches, accounting 
measurement is used most commonly  (Richard et al., 2009).  It should however be noted that 
manipulation scope of accounting number and selecting a particular method  may lead to a 
deception (Azim, 2012, Richard et al., 2009) as well as inconsistency in performance 
measurements. Market based measurement is preferred as it is forward looking and also 
incorporate intangible assets of a firm (Fisher and McGowan, 1983, Lev, 2000). Moreover,  
market based measurement may not sometime reflect accurate performance because of market 
inefficiency.   (Bacidore et al., 1997, Joh, 2003). Besides, accounting and marked based 
performance measurement, a mix method, is also available but not free from  limitations 
(Richard et al., 2009).  
Although category of firm performance indicator may have some unique features and  
limitations;  therefore, to overcome such pitfalls, a large number of prior studies put forward the 
concept of considering multiple measurement approach (Dalton et al., 1998, Dalton et al., 1999, 
Griffin and Mahon, 1997, Orlitzky et al., 2003). Accordingly, this study adopts all three types of 
measurements: accounting based, market based and mix measures. Within these three categories, 
a large number of prior studies consider either return on assets (Aerts et al., 2008, Eng and Mak, 
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2003, Patelli and Prencipe, 2007), or market capitalization (Abdolmohammadi, 2005, 
Abdulrahman Anam et al., 2011, Brammer et al., 2006), or Tobin Q (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996, Rashid et al., 2010, Rashid, 2009) as a representation of accounting, market based and 
mixed measurement respectively. Table 2 summarizes all the indicators of firm performance with 
the measurement processes, 
Table 2: Firm Performance variables with measurement process 
 
Measurement 
Category 
Variable Measurement 
 
Accounting-
Based Measure 
Return 
on Asset 
Net Profit/ Total Asset 
Market-Based 
Measure 
Market 
Capitaliz
ation 
Multiplying total common share outstanding with 
the current value of common stock 
Mixed Measure Tobin Q 
(Market Value of the Equity+ Book value of the 
debt + Book value of Preferred Stock)   
           Book value of Assets 
 
3.4 Control Variables  
Similar to several extant studies this study considers some unique control variables that 
may mediate the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance. The considered 
control variables are: (1) firm size (2) leverage of the firm (3) industry type (4) board size and  
(5) board independence 
Firm size is found to be an important factor for firm performance as larger size of a firm 
may have the privilege to achieve several capabilities to enhance a good performance (Majumdar 
and Chhibber, 1999, Short and Keasey, 1999). Accordingly, firm size is considered as a control 
variable for this study. Consistent with the prior studies, firm size is measured by natural 
logarithm of total asset (Cheng et al., 2014, Khan et al., 2013). Social disclosures might vary 
Page 16 of 36 
 
from industry to industry as the context of firm operation is not same. By considering this and 
consistent with the prior studies, industry has been considered as control variable and measured 
by using Dummy variable (value 1 = firm belongs to financial industry, value 0 = otherwise) 
(Alsaeed, 2006, Cooke, 1992). Leverage of a firm might also moderate the firm performance as it 
stimulates the cost of debt. Therefore, consistent with the prior studies it is considered as a 
control variable and  measured as Total Debt/ Equity (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006, Ho and Shun 
Wong, 2001). Besides these control variables, from corporate governance characteristics board 
size and board independence have been considered as  important factors for firm performance 
(Dalton et al., 1998, Dalton et al., 1999). Board size is important for firm performance as it 
provides the opportunity of gathering a wide range of skills, experience, knowledge and network 
provides that may lead to the firm performance. In addition, having independent directors may 
also have an impact on the decision making and may contribute to the firm performance. 
Therefore, board size and it’s independence have also been considered as  moderators of firm 
performance. Consistent with prior studies, board size is measured the natural logarithm of total 
board members (Carter et al., 2003) and board independence as the proportion of independent 
directors within the board  (Eng and Mak, 2003, Ho and Shun Wong, 2001, Khan et al., 2013) 
3.5 Regression Models Specification 
The basic models are presented as follows.  
1..*6*5*4*3*2*11 itititititititit BComBSizeIndLevFSizeCSDIaFP  
1.1..*6*5*4*3*2*11 itititititititit BComBSizeIndLevFSizeCSDIaROA  
2.1..*6*5*4*3*2*11 itititititititit BComBSizeIndLevFSizeCSDIaMcap  
3.1..*6*5*4*3*2*11 itititititititit BComBSizeIndLevFSizeCSDIaTobinQ  
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For conducting statistical analysis, it is important to satisfy the assumptions of statistical 
analyses such as normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity and endogeneity (Rashid, 2015a, 
Rashid, 2015b). Normality test (Residual Test/Histogram) for the regression equation showed a 
“Bell Shape” and confirms the normality of the data. For this study, all the models produce the 
bell shape except 1.3 regarding tobin Q. However, Coakes and Steed (2001) argue that the 
violation of normality is insignificant with a larger sample (greater than 30). Therefore, having 
larger sample (N=402) and bell shape confirms the normality and dismiss the concern. 
Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent (or explanatory) 
variables and having a high degree of correlation among the explanatory variables lead to a 
decisive result. Therefore, these variables must be removed. The correlation matrix of the 
explanatory variables (Table 3) shows that there is no strong correlation between the variables 
because the correlation coefficients are very small (less than 0.62 or negative). Further, the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the variables are less than 3.04, while it is argued that a 
VIF greater than 10 is an indication of multicollinearity (Dielman, 2001, Gujarati, 2003, Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005). In regards to heteroscedasticity, the plot of standardized residuals (ZRESID) 
versus the standardized predicted value (ZPRED) of the model does not look like a funnel or 
curve shape representing that there is no proof of heteroscedasticity. However, the chi-square 
statistics and corresponding p-value of Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey test report that 
heteroscedasticity is present. This problem is resolved by using correction technique for 
unknown heteroscedasticity of White (1980) 
(INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE) 
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Endogeneity is the relationship between any of the explanatory variables with the error 
term.  Existence of endogeneity turns the ordinary least square (OLS) estimate as inconsistent, 
and instrumental variable techniques are used to address endogeneity. Consistent with the 
suggestion of Gujarati (2003) and following  prior studies including Rashid (2015a) & Rashid 
(2015b)  the F-test for the predicted value of  CSDI  was completely or marginally  insignificant.  
Considering ROA as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 0.15 and relevant p _ 0.6953), 
Market Capitalization as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 3.64 and relevant p _ 0.0634) 
and Tobin Q as a measurement of firm performance (F _ 0.23 and relevant p _ 0.6302), the 
consistency of OLS and IVs could be confirmed as the finding of these tests indicates that there 
are no signs of potential endogeneity between CSDI and the firm performance.  
3.6 Descriptive Statistics  
 Descriptive statistical analyses of the variables are presented in Table 4. This 
statistics is employed to determine the distribution and measurement of central tendencies of the 
variables and include the mean, median, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. The 
descriptive statistics reveal that the average corporate social disclosure index is 0.16 with a range 
from 0 to 0.53. Regarding the firm performance, the average of return on asset, market 
capitalization and tobin Q is .047,  22.58 and 1.29 respectively. The range for return on asset, 
market-capitalization and Tobin Q is -.096, 19.67 and .05 to .40, 26.91 and 10.54 respectively.   
(INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE) 
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4 Empirical Results  
4.1 Results 
The regression coefficients of the relationship between corporate social disclosure and 
firm performance are presented in Table 5. Based on the regression coefficients CSD positively 
influences the firm performance. In particular, the coefficients of Corporate Social Disclosure is 
found to be positive and significantly related to ROA (pooled OLS=0.008
***
, 2SLS=0.000
***
), 
MCAP (pooled OLS=0.000
***
, 2SLS=0.066
*
) and Tobin Q (pooled OLS=0.010
***
, 
2SLS=0.024
***
). Therefore, the results of pooled OLS and 2SLS suggest that the CSD positively 
associated with the firm performance in a significant manner.  These findings suggest that CSD 
of a firm is likely to be positively affecting the firm performance. These findings could be 
considered as a strong support as the data used in this study are panel data, and heterogeneity 
issue has been resolved, no endogeneity is observed and two different statistical models (pooled 
OLS, 2SLS) have contributed the same results. The results of this study are consistent with 
legitimacy and signaling theory. As on the concept of both theories, firms consider CSD as signal 
of effective communication to reduce information asymmetry and  approach of legitimizing 
operational activities (Deegan et al., 2002, Hossain et al., 2015, Morris, 1987, Whiting and 
Miller, 2008). Such consideration helps a firm to create a positive impression regarding the firm 
activities among the interested parties, which lead to a better firm performance. In other word, 
information asymmetry reduces due to CSD and facilitates to develop a good firm value within 
the market.  Results of this study establish these theoretical arguments.  Therefore, the findings of 
these results may provide a strong support in favor of considering social issues from firm level 
and policymakers may encourage on social issues more efficiently. Similarly, firms may also find 
Page 20 of 36 
 
justification to encourage social issues as a part of regular operation in strategic level as it 
stimulates firm performance. 
(INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE) 
4.2 Robustness check 
To confirm the robustness of the result, this study conducts two further tests. First, this 
study examines the effects of three categories of CSD (long, short, general) on following year 
firm performance by replacing overall CSD. Second, an additional endogeneity test has been 
applied to check the causality issue.  
4.2.1 The effects of the categories of corporate social disclosure on firm performance  
To confirm the robustness of the result a further test has been applied by considering each 
category of social disclosure (long-term, short-term and generic disclosure) over the firm 
performance. In doing so, the following models have been applied.  
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
  
The regression coefficients of the effects of various categories of CSD on firm 
performance are presented in the Table 6. Based on the regression coefficients, strategic/ long 
term social disclosure is the key factor for improving firm performance. From every indicator of 
firm performance context, it is found that strategic/ long term CSD positively (ROA=0.015
***
 ; 
Page 21 of 36 
 
Market Capitalization=0.000
***
  and Tobin Q=0.010
***
 ) influence firm performance. In contrast, 
short-term is not significantly (ROA=0.712; Market Capitalization=0.490; and Tobin Q=0.505) 
associated with firm performance. Regarding the effects of generic CSD, firm performance 
(ROA and Tobin Q) is not affected (ROA=0.506; and Tobin Q=0.844) except for the market 
capitalization (0.002
***
). This provides evidence that considering social disclosure from the 
strategic context is the key to lead the firm performance. Therefore, these findings may provide a 
strong support to the policy maker as well as the firm to consider the social issue from the 
strategic level with a long-term vision in the context of Bangladesh. Regarding the firm 
performance from market capitalization measurement, it is solely reflected the investors 
perception while accounting and mixed measure the investors perception is not directly related. 
As a result, it could be assumed some investors from Bangladesh might not be well 
knowledgeable regarding the social disclosure with exceptions.  
(INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE) 
Based on the regression coefficients long-term corporate social disclosure is the key to 
influence firm performance as the other types are not significantly associated with firm 
performance. This result suggests that considering social issues with a focus from strategic view 
helps to stimulate firm performance.  
4.2.2 Additional Endogeneity Test   
In regards to the relationship between firm performance and corporate social disclosure, 
reverse causality problem is a concern as in the literature. It is also documented that firm 
performance also have an influence of the corporate social disclosure (Branco and Rodrigues, 
2008, Qiu et al., 2016). This study already employed the lag of social disclosure to avoid such 
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causality problem. To confirm the reverse causality issue further, a final check of endogeneity by 
a simple crossed-lagged regression model has been applied by following (Davidson et al., 1997) 
and Rashid (2015a). In so doing, the following six models have been considered: 
 
)1..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDIROAaROA    
)2..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDIMcapaMcap    
)3..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDITobinQaTobinQ    
)4..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDITobinQaCSDI    
)5..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDIROAaCSDI    
)6..(*2*11 itititit VariablescontrolOtherCSDIMcapaCSDI    
 
Within the first three equations, the following year firm performance is considered as a 
dependent variable over the current year social disclosure and firm performance. In the following 
three equations, next year social disclosure is considered as dependent by considering current 
year firm performance and social disclosure as independent variable. Based on the results of first 
three equations, it has been supported that the current year firm performance is significantly 
associated with the future firm performance. However, based on the result of last three equations, 
current year firm performance is not found to be affecting the following year corporate social 
disclosure.  The result from the above six equations can be concluded that there is no reverse 
casualty between firm performance and corporate social disclosure within this research context.  
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This study examines the effects of corporate social disclosure on firm performance by 
considering the year 2011 to 2013 and 2012 to 2014 for CSD and firm performance respectively 
within Bangladesh context as a developing country. 
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The findings of this study suggest that CSD of a firm has significant positive effect on the 
firm performance. These results verify the hypotheses and are also consistent with the theoretical 
framework that predicts a positive association between CSD and firm performance. It should also 
be noted that the finding is robust for several reasons. First, firm performance from categories of 
indicators including return on asset, market capitalization, and tobin Q are significantly related to 
the firm performance. This finding is also consistent with  prior studies that investigate the 
effects of CSD on firm performance (Hossain et al., 2015, Platonova et al., 2016). However, very 
limited studies confirm such result by considering every indicator of firm performance. Second, 
from the endogeneity test of this study further confirm that it is a strong finding as there is no 
endogeneity problem. Finally, this study conducts an additional test to find which category is the 
key factor for firm performance and report that long-term social disclosure is the key to 
stimulating firm performance. However, this study is not free from limitations. First, this study 
limits the social disclosure within 30 items for conducting the content analysis. Future study may 
consider interview or case study to gather entity specific information for such revelations. 
Second, the sample is limited to the top 134 firms in Bangladesh and the result might not be 
applicable for all firms.   
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Appendix A 
Main 
Disclosure 
Disclosure 
Category 
Disclosure Details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Social 
Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic or         
long-term focus 
1. Existence of l committee for social affairs. 
2. Board takes care about social issues as a significant matter. 
3. Governance encompasses ethics, transparency and accountability. 
4. A commentary on behalf of the board about the key relationship with 
employee and other significant stakeholders.  
5. Firm policy to promote social welfare. 
6. Key person’s (CEO or chairman) views about social issues. 
7. CEO statement about considering social issues to the shareholders/ 
stakeholders.  
8. A statement that the firm maintains regular review of social factors. 
9. Firm has specific policy for maintaining human rights. 
10. Firm has a specific code of conduct to main non-discrimination in 
regards to gender, race, religion or ethnic group.  
11. Firm activities are affiliated with International Labour Organization. 
12. Firm has a specific policy about child labour. 
13. Firm has a specific policy about working hour and overtime payment.  
14. Firm has specific and clear guideline about employee promotion 
15. Firm has faculties about staff training, education, prevention and 
control program to manage or avoid work related injuries. 
16. Firm has a budget for staff welfare.  
17. Amount spent of staff welfare has mentioned. 
18. Firm has a clear guideline to handle complained about harassment or 
abuse of any employee at any form. 
19. Firm has a specific policy regarding security and employment of 
workers  
 
 
 
 
Short-term focus 
20.  Community involvement or donation on social issues. 
21. Firm has a policy to prioritise greater benefit for the welfare of their 
society.  
22. Firm has policies and procedure to about anti-corruption. 
23. Firm has policy to provide a fair chance to work as a trainee to 
various education institute students.  
24. Firm has policy to maintain local and national culture and protection 
of personal information. 
25. Firm has a policy about disadvantage side of the society.  
26. Firm has a policy to sponsor regional of national educational, cultural 
event. 
27. A statement about product safety assurance. 
28. A statement about quality assurance in regards to service or product.  
Generic Disclosure 
29. Any moral statement for considering social issues. 
30. Any statement about social welfare for public awareness. 
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Table 3 Correlation coefficient matrix and Variance Inflation factor (VIF) 
  CSDI Board Size Board Independence  Leverage Sector Firm Size VIF 
CSDI 1            2.401989 
Board Size 0.6233768 1          2.553555 
Board Independence  -0.0366165 -0.0634219 1        1.221097 
Leverage 0.3272686 0.2632631 0.0399622 1      1.029049 
Sector 0.3500395 0.4194249 -0.0451973 0.6301098 1    2.277089 
Firm Size -0.0886693 -0.1117953 0.0520496 -0.2310624 -0.3927142 1  3.040517 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistic of the variables (N =402) 
  ROA MCAP TBQ SDI Firm Size Leverage Sector Board Size Board Independence 
 Mean 0.0473 22.5836 1.2982 0.1691 21.8905 1.2420 0.3657 2.1889 0.1685 
 Median 0.0258 22.5436 0.9831 0.1333 21.8430 0.4675 0.0000 2.1972 0.1538 
 Maximum 0.4010 26.9150 10.5491 0.5333 25.6752 78.5667 1.0000 3.2189 0.8000 
 Minimum -0.0965 19.6735 0.0512 0.0000 18.0474 0.0059 0.0000 1.0986 0.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.0572 1.1969 1.4273 0.1414 1.5291 4.3120 0.4822 0.3782 0.1130 
 Observations 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 402 
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* Indicate statistically significant at the 10% level 
** Indicate statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicate statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Regression Analyses regarding the effects of CSD on firm performance.  
Independent 
Variables 
Return on Asset Market Capitalization Tobin Q 
Pooled OLS 2SLS     Pooled OLS 2SLS Pooled OLS 2SLS 
  Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
CSDI 0.065 2.640 0.008
*** 0.086 3.378 0.000*** 1.615 4.600 0.000*** 0.696 1.842 0.066* 1.575 2.581 0.010 1.621 2.262 0.024*** 
Firm Size 0.002 1.041 0.298 -0.000 -.343 0.731 0.507 14.332 0.000
*** 0.660 15.418 0.000*** -0.182 -2.595 0.009 -0.190 -2.029 0.043** 
Leverage -0.000 -1.766 0.078
* -0.000 -1.742 0.082* -0.018 -5.311 0.000*** -0.016 -4.409 0.000*** -0.005 -1.169 0.243 -0.005 -1.220 0.223 
Sector -0.066 -11.767 0.000
*** -0.067 -11.930 0.000*** -0.218 -2.310 0.021*** -0.171 -1.733 0.083* -1.494 -10.577 0.000 -1.496 -10.742 0.000*** 
Board Size 0.006 .836 0.403 0.010 1.37 0.170 0.146 1.1952 0.232 -0.039 -0.303 0.761 0.182 0.929 0.353 0.191 0.940 0.347 
Board 
Independence  
-0.006 -.290 0.771 -0.004 -.218 0.824 -0.344 -1.010 0.313 -0.414 -1.157 0.247 0.247 0.442 0.658 0.251 0.451 0.651 
  
R
2-       0.270  R2   0.265 R2   0.623 R2   0.602 R2   0.254 R2   0.254 
Adjusted R
2   0.259 Adjusted R2   0.254 Adjusted R2   0.617 Adjusted R2   0.595 Adjusted R2   0.242 Adjusted R2   0.242 
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Table 6 Regression Analyses regarding the effects of CSD categories (strategic/long, short, generic) on firm performance  
 
Independent 
Variables 
Return on Asset Market Capitalization Tobin Q 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
Long-term 0.065 2.432 0.015
***
 1.530 3.999 0.000
***
 
1.584 2.561 0.010
*
 
Short-term 0.005 0.368 0.712 -0.181 -0.689 0.490 
0.232 0.666 0.505 
Generic 0.005 0.665 0.506 0.437 3.029 0.002
***
 0.045 0.196 0.844 
Firm Size 0.002 1.064 0.287 0.501 14.087 0.000
***
 -0.178 -2.540 0.011 
Leverage -0.000 -1.733 0.083
*
 -0.020 -4.910 0.000
***
 -0.004 -0.884 0.377 
Sector -0.066 -11.738 0.000
***
 -0.240 -2.521 0.012
***
 -1.470 -10.603 0.000
***
 
Board Size 0.005 0.759 0.447 0.107 0.861 0.389 
0.178 0.894 0.371 
Board 
Independence  
-0.006 -0.320 0.748 -0.407 -1.218 0.223 
0.247 0.440 0.659 
  R
2-       0.272 R2-       0.630 R2-       0.255    
 
  
Adjusted R
2   0.257 Adjusted R2   0.624 Adjusted R2   0.240 
 
* Indicate statistically significant at the 10% level 
** Indicate statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Indicate statistically significant at the 1% level 
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